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Abstract 
The ironic effect of thought suppression refers to the phenomenon in which individuals trying to rid 
their mind of a target thought ironically experience greater levels of occurrence and accessibility of 
the thought compared to individuals that deliberately concentrate on the thought (Wegner, 1994). 
Ironic effects occurring after thought suppression, also known as rebound effects, have been 
consistently detected by previous meta-analyses. However, ironic effects that occur during thought 
suppression, also known as immediate enhancement effects, have been found to be largely absent. In 
the current meta-analysis, we test Wegner’s original proposition that detection of immediate 
enhancement effects is dependent on the cognitive load experienced by individuals when enacting 
thought suppression. Given that thought suppression is an effortful cognitive process, it is proposed 
that the introduction of additional cognitive load would compete for the allocation of existing 
cognitive resources and impair capacity for thought suppression. Studies (k = 31) consistent with 
Wegner’s original thought suppression paradigm were analysed. Consistent with our predictions, 
rebound effects were observed regardless of cognitive load while immediate enhancement effects 
were only observed in the presence of cognitive load. Implications are discussed in light of ironic 
process theory and suggestions for future thought suppression research provided. 
Keywords: thought suppression, ironic effect, immediate enhancement effect, rebound effect, 
cognitive load 
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Ironic Effects of Thought Suppression: A Meta-Analysis 
People regularly experience unwanted intrusive thoughts (Rachman & de Silva, 1978). Such 
thought intrusions can interfere with attention and executive functioning, and impair performance on 
everyday tasks (Posner & Snyder, 1975). Intrusive thoughts can also compromise attempts to break 
habits like drinking or overeating (e.g., Erskine & Georgiou, 2010), manage social prejudices 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994), or cope with negative emotions like anger (Quartana 
& Burns, 2007). As a consequence, the ability to effectively manage unwanted thoughts is adaptive 
and can promote task performance and behavioral regulation. Thought suppression is an effective 
mental control strategy that can be used to control unwanted thoughts (Najmi, Riemann, & Wegner, 
2009). Thought suppression may be useful for minimizing the interference of intrusive thoughts and 
can assist in promoting task performance and effective behavioral regulation. 
However, evidence stemming from Wegner’s (1994) ironic process theory suggests that there 
are occasions where individuals engaged in suppressing an undesirable thought do not merely fail to 
do so, but, ironically, find themselves thinking of the very thought that they are trying to avoid 
(Wegner, 2009). Thus, for example, dieters trying to avoid thinking of processed foods may 
ironically find themselves thinking of processed foods, which may instigate food cravings, and 
smokers trying to quit smoking and suppress thoughts of having a cigarette may find themselves 
thinking of cigarettes, which may activate a desire to smoke. In essence, thought suppression is a 
fundamental constituent of human cognition (Wegner, 1994), and its success and failure has 
implications on a wide range of broad life domains, such as emotion regulation (Beevers & Meyer, 
2008), memory (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997), self-control (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010), and rumination (Erber & Wegner, 1996). 
Wegner (1994) coined the term ‘ironic effect’ to describe the uncontrollable preoccupation 
with a ‘to-be-supressed’ thought that individuals experience during and after thought suppression. In 
experimental studies, the ironic effect during thought suppression, also known as the ‘immediate 
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enhancement effect’, is confirmed when participants instructed to suppress a target thought1 exhibit 
higher levels of accessibility or occurrence of that thought than individuals who are instructed to 
concentrate on the same thought. The effect is labelled ‘ironic’ because the goal of thought 
suppression is to reduce target thought occurrence and accessibility, yet those engaged in suppression 
experience higher levels of target thought occurrence and accessibility compared to those actually 
concentrating on the thought itself. Interestingly, such ironic effects manifest not only in thought 
suppression, but in a variety of other mental control endeavours. For example, studies have 
suggested that individuals trying to fall asleep as quickly as possible ironically fall asleep more 
slowly than individuals trying to stay awake (Ansfield, Wegner, & Bowser, 1996). Furthermore, 
individuals trying to resist persuasion by product advertisements ironically report greater beliefs in 
the effectiveness of the advertised product compared to individuals trying to believe in its 
effectiveness (Houston & Wegner, 1993). In research on stereotyping, exposing individuals to 
positive stereotypes toward social groups (e.g., African Americans are superior athletes) resulted, 
ironically, in increased application of prejudicial beliefs and negative stereotypes (e.g., beliefs in 
biological underpinnings of athleticism); Kay, Day, Zanna, & Nussbaum, 2013). 
While ironic effects during mental control appear to be a pervasive phenomenon across 
multiple life domains (Wegner, 1994), previous research in the thought suppression domain have 
failed to support such ironic phenomena. In fact, previous syntheses have revealed opposite effects to 
those predicted by Wegner’s (1994) ironic process theory. Specifically, two meta-analyses found that 
thought suppression reduces, rather than increases, the occurrence and accessibility of target thoughts 
during thought suppression relative to concentration (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Magee, 
Harden, & Teachman, 2012). However, we contend that these analyses provide misleading estimates 
of thought suppression and the immediate enhancement effect because the meta-analytic estimates 
                                                             
1In the present article, we used the terms ‘to-be-suppressed thought’ and ‘target thought’ interchangeably. This is because 
the control group is instructed to concentrate on, rather than suppress, a thought. Since ‘to-be-suppressed thought’ only 
pertains to the suppression group, it was more appropriate at times to use the more generic term ‘target thought’. 
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were derived from samples of studies that did not satisfy specific theoretical preconditions, which, 
according to Wegner (1994), give rise to the immediate enhancement effect. Specifically, we contend 
that, like ironic effects of mental control more broadly, valid tests of the immediate enhancement 
effect of thought suppression should be conducted under conditions of cognitive load. In the present 
article, we report an updated meta-analysis of articles that provide valid tests of Wegner’s (1994) 
ironic process theory. Specifically, we present evidence supporting the immediate enhancement 
effect when thought suppression experiments conform to the conditions specified by Wegner (1994). 
Our analysis will demonstrate the importance of cognitive load in inducing the immediate 
enhancement effect, and offer guidance to researchers on effective means to test and detect 
immediate enhancement effects in thought suppression experiments. 
Ironic Process Theory: Mechanisms and Boundary Conditions 
According to ironic process theory, the immediate enhancement effect is the result of two 
cognitive processes working in synergy to produce mental control (Wegner, 1994). The first process 
is governed by an intentional system - a conscious, effortful process that is inefficient because it 
requires considerable allocation of cognitive resources for effective operation (Wegner, 2009). The 
main function of the intentional process is to search and generate ‘self-distracting’ thoughts, or 
distractors, that are semantically unrelated to the target thought individuals are trying to suppress. 
For example, a dieter may actively search for unrelated thoughts such as future holiday plans, and 
concentrate on the unrelated thoughts in order to avoid thinking of palatable foods. The second 
process is a monitoring system. Unlike the intentional process, the monitoring system is an 
unintentional, non-conscious processes that requires minimal cognitive resources to operate and is 
relatively fast and efficient (Bargh, 1994; Wegner, 2009). This process is responsible for the 
immediate enhancement effect because during thought suppression operations, the monitoring 
system continuously and automatically searches for the to-be-suppressed thought (Wegner, Erber, & 
Zanakos, 1993). For example, attempts to suppress ‘sad thoughts’ may be subverted during thought 
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suppression by the monitoring system that is hypersensitive to, and automatically searching for, sad 
thoughts (Wegner et al., 1993). 
In addition to the immediate enhancement effect, ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994) has 
been influential in explaining the ironic phenomenon after thought suppression operations, also 
known as the ‘rebound’ effect (Wegner, 2009; Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990; Wenzlaff, 
Wegner, & Roper, 1988). The rebound effect is characterized by the higher levels of post-suppression 
resurgence and accessibility of the target thought experienced by individuals engaged in thought 
suppression relative to individuals who did not suppress the target thought in the first place. In 
laboratory settings, the rebound effect is tested by prompting participants assigned to the thought 
suppression and concentration groups to concentrate on the same target thought in the post-
suppression period. A rebound effect is confirmed if participants in the thought suppression condition 
report higher occurrence and accessibility of the target thought in this period than participants in the 
concentration condition. It is important to note that thought preoccupation, the dependent variable of 
interest in thought suppression experiments, has typically been inferred through either (a) self-reports 
of thought occurrence, such as having individuals record each occurrence with a dash and tallying 
the total (e.g., Wang, Chatzisarantis, & Hagger, 2017), or (b) implicit measures of thought 
accessibility using timed tasks such as the sentence unscrambling task where the proportion of target 
thought-related vs. target thought-unrelated sentences unscrambled reflects levels of accessibility of 
the target thought (e.g., Beevers & Meyer, 2008). The rebound effect occurs because directing 
attention to distractors during thought suppression leads to the formation of cognitive associations 
between the unwanted thought and the distractors (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). These 
associations facilitate activation of the target thought during the subsequent concentration period 
through a ‘negative cueing’ mechanism (Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff et al., 1988). For example, 
individuals suppressing the thought of a ‘white bear’ may direct their attention to objects in their 
surroundings such as a computer, which becomes implicitly labelled as a ‘white bear-unrelated 
IRONIC EFFECTS OF THOUGHT SUPPRESSION 7 
 
thought’. During the subsequent concentration period, the computer may act as a reminder cue that 
activates thoughts of the white bear, thereby increasing its occurrence and accessibility. 
In introducing ironic process theory, Wegner (1994) suggested that one of the central 
variables that determines the immediate enhancement effect is the availability of mental resources. 
From this perspective, thought suppression is likely to be successful when individuals have adequate 
mental resources to search for distracting thoughts (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Wegner, 
2009). The reason for this is that when individuals have sufficient mental resources, the intentional 
system operates effectively and ‘populates’ the stream of consciousness with thoughts unrelated to 
the target thought – a process known as ‘self-distraction’. This increased level of attentional 
engagement prevents individuals’ attention from straying and encountering target-related thoughts, 
and hence minimizes the monitoring system’s opportunities of detecting these thoughts (Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). However, when mental capacity is reduced by the imposition of cognitive load 
during suppression such as stress, time pressure, a concurrent task, or any source of external 
distraction that diverts individuals’ attention from the suppression task (Wegner, 2009), suppressors 
are likely to experience an immediate enhancement effect (Slepian, Oikawa, & Smyth, 2014). This is 
because the process underpinning the intentional search for distractors is effortful and dependent on 
mental resources (Mitchell et al., 2007). Since cognitive load partially occupies a portion of an 
individual’s mental resources, the capacity of their intentional system to generate distractors is 
impeded. Given the effortless nature of the monitoring system, the increased sensitivity to target-
related thoughts and the undermined intentional system, individuals are more likely to encounter 
target-related thoughts in their stream of consciousness, leading to an immediate enhancement effect. 
The centrality of cognitive load as a boundary condition in self-distraction failures and hence 
immediate enhancement effects has been supported by experimental evidence. For example, Wegner 
and Erber (1992) demonstrated that while suppressors experienced lower levels of target thought 
preoccupation compared to concentrators under no cognitive load, suppressors ironically experienced 
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greater levels of target thought preoccupation compared to concentrators when cognitive load was 
imposed. 
It is important to note that although the manifestation of the immediate enhancement effect 
depends on the presence of cognitive load, according to ironic process theory, the rebound effect 
should manifest regardless of cognitive load. The reason for this is that in the absence of cognitive 
load, individuals can find distractors without difficulty. A rebound effect is, therefore, likely to be 
observed due to the negative cueing mechanism mentioned earlier, that is, cognitive associations 
formed between distractors and the target thought (Wegner et al., 1987). Under conditions of 
cognitive load on the other hand, the increased difficulties and subsequent failures that individuals 
encounter in searching for distractors can temporarily exacerbate accessibility of the target thought. 
Increased accessibility of the target thought in turn facilitates the rebound effect because, by 
definition, individuals are more sensitive to accessible than less accessible thoughts (Bargh, 1994). 
Limitations of Previous Meta-Analytic Findings 
To date, a considerable number of studies have examined ironic effects of thought 
suppression during and after thought suppression periods (e.g., Denzler, Forster, Liberman, & 
Rozenman, 2010; Guiliano & Wicha, 2010; Slepian et al., 2014). While meta-analytic research has 
consistently observed the rebound effect after thought suppression, they have not always provided 
unequivocal support for the immediate enhancement effect during suppression (Abramowitz et al., 
2001; Magee et al., 2012). The lack of support for the immediate enhancement effect cannot be 
attributed to methodological differences across studies because variations in methodological factors, 
such as target thought emotional valence, have been corrected for in previous meta-analyses 
(Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012). However, a limitation of previous meta-analyses is 
that they did not systematically test the immediate enhancement effect in the presence and absence of 
cognitive load separately (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012). This may explain why 
previous meta-analytic data failed to find support for the immediate enhancement effect – cognitive 
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load is a precondition that facilitates emergence of the effect during thought suppression according to 
ironic process theory (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). As such, results of previous primary and meta-
analytic research that excludes cognitive load as a precondition may lead researchers to incorrectly 
reject the immediate enhancement effect of thought suppression. Analogously, a number of studies 
have observed immediate enhancement effects under conditions of cognitive load (Slepian et al., 
2014; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al., 1993). In order to resolve the inconsistency in previous 
thought suppression research, we conducted a meta-analysis re-examining the immediate 
enhancement effect in studies in which participants were prompted to suppress thoughts under 
cognitive load. The analysis will provide a ‘good faith’ test of the immediate enhancement effect 
consistent with ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994). 
Overview and Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of the present meta-analysis was to re-examine whether research testing 
ironic effects during and after thought suppression yielded findings consistent with Wegner’s (1994) 
ironic process theory. Specifically, we synthesized immediate enhancement and rebound effects in 
research on thought suppression in the presence and absence of cognitive load during thought 
suppression. We predicted that the immediate enhancement effect would be observed among studies 
in which cognitive load was present, while the effect would be no different from zero, or negative, 
when cognitive load was not induced. We reasoned that the immediate enhancement effect would 
only be evident when the effectiveness of the intentional system in searching for distractors is 
compromised, as Wegner (1994) suggested, and therefore expected that the immediate enhancement 
effect would only be observed in studies that tested thought suppression under cognitive load. The 
reason for this is that cognitive load impedes the effectiveness of the resource-dependent intentional 
system in finding distractors. In contrast, we predicted that the rebound effect would be observed 
regardless of whether cognitive load was imposed, consistent with previous research. This is because 
rebound effects do not rely on availability of mental capacity and the corresponding effectiveness of 
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the intentional system in finding distractors. 
Method 
Search Strategy 
A systematic literature search was performed of four electronic databases (PsycINFO, 
PubMed, Medline and ERIC) as well as ProQuest dissertations and theses from their inception to 
December 2018. This search targeted English language experimental studies and dissertations 
involving thought suppression and some measure of target thought occurrence or accessibility during 
or after thought suppression. In addition, the reference lists of two previous thought suppression 
meta-analyses (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012) were searched for eligible studies. We 
also contacted key authors for any unpublished thought suppression studies. To facilitate a 
comprehensive search, a broad search string (“thought suppression” AND “distract” OR “intrusion” 
OR “rebound”) was used for all database searches.  
Eligibility Criteria 
Studies had to satisfy a series of criteria for inclusion in the present analysis. First, only 
experimental studies with at least one thought suppression (excluding focused-distraction2) condition 
were considered. This meant that cross-sectional studies that examined correlations between thought 
suppression habits and frequencies of thought occurrence were not included (e.g., Malinowski, 
2017). Second, studies needed to have a valid quantitative dependent measure of thought occurrence 
or accessibility either during or after suppression. This includes explicit measures such as 
participants’ tallies of their target thought occurrence (e.g., Magee & Zinbarg, 2007), and implicit 
                                                             
2Unlike standard thought suppression instructions in which participants are simply asked not to think about a target 
thought, focused-distraction instructions require participants to focus on a single predetermined distractor thought in 
order not to think about a target thought. This method was originally introduced in an attempt to elucidate the mental 
processes underlying self-distraction and ironic effects, rather than to elicit ironic effects (Wegner et al., 1987). In fact, 
focused-distraction is fundamentally different from standard thought suppression because it seeks to mitigate ironic 
effects by shifting suppressors’ ‘thought avoidance’ mentality into a ‘thought approach’ mentality (Wegner, 1994). This 
makes focused-distraction arguably more similar to concentration in nature, rather than suppression. Given that the 
present study is concerned with detecting ironic effects rather than making comparisons between suppression and 
focused-distraction, only thought suppression studies adopting this design were included. 
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measures of target thought accessibility such as word association tasks that sought to capture 
participants’ sensitivity to the target thought (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992).  
Finally, a key methodological issue in thought suppression research, and one that is 
particularly relevant to synthesizing thought suppression effects across studies, is choosing the 
appropriate control condition (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Many experiments include multiple 
control conditions against which suppression of the unwanted target thought is compared (e.g., 
Erskine, 2008; Litvin, Kovacs, Hayes, & Brandon, 2012). The pre-eminent control condition in 
thought suppression experiments is a concentration control condition in which participants are asked 
to concentrate on the target thought (Wegner, 1994). However, an alternative control condition used 
in some thought suppression experiments involves asking participants to simply think about anything 
freely; a ‘free thought’ control (e.g., Gillie, Vasey, & Thayer, 2015). Both suppression and 
concentration are different from ‘free thought’ in that they are effortful processes that involve a goal 
state and an undesired state (Wegner, 1994). This means that it is possible, especially under 
conditions of cognitive load, for both suppression and concentration processes to fail, and, ironically, 
yield thought occurrences opposite to that of the individual’s goal, hence the term ‘ironic’ effects 
(Wegner, 2009). Studies have shown that under cognitive load, ironic effects result from the contrast 
between increased target thought preoccupation among suppressors and decreased target thought 
preoccupation among concentrators (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al, 1993). Given that ‘free 
thought’ is not vulnerable to failures or ironic effects, and that the focus of the present study is to 
precisely test ironic effects, only studies that utilized an expression control condition in which 
participants were asked to deliberately focus on a target thought were included. The search strategy 
and process of identifying eligible studies are presented in Appendix A (Supplemental Materials). 
The search and selection process yielded 31 studies with 83 unique effect sizes eligible for inclusion. 
Data Extraction and Effect Conceptualizations 
Some studies provided information for more than one comparison, for example, comparisons 
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between suppression and control groups for both an anxious sample and a non-clinical sample 
(Magee & Zinbarg, 2007). Effect sizes from these comparisons were included as separate samples 
where data were available. Methods used to induce cognitive load during thought suppression 
included tasks in which participants were asked to concurrently engage in a word association task 
under time pressure (Wegner & Erber, 1992, Experiment 1), memorize a number string (Magee & 
Zinbarg, 2007; Slepian et al., 2014; Wegner & Erber, 1992, Experiment 2), or tolerate pain (Cioffi & 
Holloway, 1993). Cognitive load, when present, was only induced during, not after, thought 
suppression. 
We encountered two barriers to data extraction. First, some studies measured accessibility or 
occurrence of target thoughts using more than one type of dependent measure. For example, Giuliano 
and Wicha (2010) asked participants to suppress a target thought and used both self-reported target 
thought occurrence and electrophysiological responses associated with target thought occurrences as 
dependent measures. In these cases, we calculated effect sizes from direct measures of thought 
occurrences, such as self-reports of target thought occurrences, rather than data from indirect 
measures, such as electrophysiological measures used to infer target thought occurrences. Second, in 
cases where critical data were not reported, such as failure to report effect size data or the sample 
sizes separately for the suppression and control conditions, we contacted the authors to check 
whether these data were available. In cases where effect size data were unavailable and the authors 
could not be contacted, the study was omitted (see Appendix B, Supplemental Materials). In cases 
where effect size data were available, but data on sample size for each experimental group were 
unavailable after contacting authors or the authors could not be contacted, equal sample size across 
conditions was assumed and noted (see Appendix C, Supplemental Materials). 
It is important to note that depending on their specific research question, researchers have 
typically conducted thought suppression experiments using between-participants, within-participants, 
or cross-over study designs. Between-participants studies refer to studies in which suppression and 
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expression participants have been separated into independent groups and tested using a paradigm 
involving an initial period (suppression instructions vs expression instructions) followed by a 
rebound period (both conditions receive expression instructions) (e.g., Tong, Ang, & Chua, 2013). 
Within-participant studies, on the other hand, only examine one group of participants using a 
baseline, suppression and rebound phase (e.g., Rutledge, Hancock, & Rutledge, 1996). Cross-over 
studies refer to studies where both groups of participants have been asked to engage in suppression 
and expression periods, but in reverse order, resulting in an initial suppression group and an initial 
expression group (e.g., Bourdon, McKelvie, & Stout, 2001). For between-participant studies, 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects were conceptualized as the difference between the two 
groups during the suppression and the rebound periods respectively. For cross-over studies, the same 
conceptualization was adopted for the immediate enhancement effect while the rebound effect was 
conceptualized as the difference in the outcome measure during the expression period for the initial 
suppression group and the initial expression group (Bourdon et al., 2001). For within-participant 
studies, the immediate enhancement effect was conceptualized as the difference between suppression 
period outcomes and baseline period outcomes, while the rebound effect was conceptualized as the 
difference between the rebound period outcomes and baseline period outcomes (Rutledge et al., 
1996). A schematic representation of the three study designs and how immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects are conceptualized is presented in Figure 1. 
---Insert Figure 1 here--- 
Meta-Analytic Strategy3 
Effect size computation. Cohen’s d was used as the effect size metric (Hunter & Schmidt, 
2004). Our preferred method of computing effect sizes involved subtracting the concentration group 
mean from the suppression group mean, and dividing this difference by the pooled standard 
                                                             
3Data files, analysis scripts and output files are available online at: 
https://osf.io/eqmwt/?view_only=6e0ad20c2a5c48b296e61d37079a5fba 
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deviation (SD). This required the means, SDs, and sample sizes for each condition. In cases where 
this information was not available, effect sizes were calculated using t- or F-values using appropriate 
formulae (Ray & Shadish, 1996). Furthermore, studies adopting within-participant designs require 
the correlation between the pre- and post-experimental measures to calculate the effect size. Attempts 
were made to obtain these values from authors. In cases where these data were unavailable, we used 
a conservative estimate of the pre-post correlation (r = .50; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2009). Finally, we were unable to obtain sufficient data to compute effect sizes from the 
authors of several studies. In these cases, we consulted data from a previous meta-analysis where 
available (Abramowitz et al., 2001). 
In the context of the present meta-analysis, a positive effect size is indicative of an immediate 
enhancement or rebound effect as it indicates higher target thought occurrence or accessibility in the 
suppression group compared to the concentration group. A negative or null effect size, on the other 
hand, supports the absence of immediate enhancement or rebound effect as it indicates that the 
suppression group performed more successfully than, or no different from, the control group in 
reducing target thought occurrence or accessibility. 
Meta-analytic method. We computed the overall weighted mean effect size (d+) and 
variability estimates of the immediate enhancement and rebound effects across studies using the 
metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in R using a random effects model and the restricted maximum 
likelihood estimator (Raudenbush, 2009; Viechtbauer, 2005). A random effects model was assumed 
because effect sizes likely come from different populations of studies, and the assumption of a single 
overarching population mean effect size, as assumed by a fixed effects model, does not fit the 
historical records of thought suppression studies, which often yield inconsistent findings 
(Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012). The restricted maximum likelihood estimator has 
demonstrated low bias and high precision, particularly in variance estimates, in simulation studies 
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with continuous data (Veroniki et al., 2015).4 
We also computed the 95% confidence intervals (CI) about the mean effect size. In addition, 
we calculated a number of heterogeneity statistics, which allowed us to determine the variability in 
effect sizes across the pool of studies remaining after controlling for sampling error. These estimates 
are informative of the extent to which bias correction accounts for the observed variability in the 
effect sizes across studies, and whether the effect size is likely subject to extraneous moderator 
variables. Cochrane’s (1952) Q and I2 values provide an indication of the extent to which observed 
variability in the effect sizes can be attributed to true heterogeneity rather than sampling error. Values 
of less than 25%, between 25% and 50%, and greater than 50% for the I2 correspond to small, 
medium, and high levels of heterogeneity, respectively (Higgins & Thompson, 2002). Finally, τ2 is 
presented as an estimate of between-study variance. 
To address our primary research question that the immediate enhancement effect would only 
be observed under cognitive load, we computed bias-corrected effect size estimates in groups of 
studies that incorporated some form of cognitive load and those that did not, and compared the 
averaged effect sizes using the confidence interval of the difference in effect size estimates. A 
confidence interval about the difference in effect sizes that does not include zero would provide 
confirmation that the effect size estimates differed across the load and no load groups, verified by a 
formal significance test (Schenker & Gentleman, 2001). If, however, no moderation effect is 
detected, the overall effect size will be interpreted, as suggested by Aiken and West (1991). 
Small study bias. Computed effect sizes in meta-analyses are sometimes subject to small 
study bias. A primary source of such bias is publication bias, which is the result of publication outlets 
tending to prioritize publication of underpowered studies reporting statistically significant, and often 
disproportionally large, effects. Means to estimate small study bias are based on ‘funnel’ plots, which 
                                                             
4Fixed-effect estimates are provided for comparison 
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plot the effect size from each study against a precision estimate, usually the standard error of the 
effect size. For groups of studies without bias, the plot should resemble a distinct ‘funnel’ shape. A 
formal test is provided by regressing the precision estimate on the effect size estimate, which also 
provides a corrected estimate of the effect size in the absence of bias (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & 
Minder, 1997). We provided two variations of the regression test for small study bias in our analyses, 
the precision effect test (PET) and the precision effect estimate with standard error (PEESE). The 
estimates were computed using the PETPEESE function in R (Carter, Schönbrodt, Hilgard, & 
Gervais, 2017). Corrected effect size estimates based on the PET and PEESE analyses for each effect 
size were computed, with corresponding t-tests for the presence of bias and significance tests of bias 
corrected effect sizes from zero. These analyses are based on fixed effects estimates, and simulation 
studies suggest that when the average bias-corrected effect size from PET is not statistically 
significant (i.e., when the estimate is not distinguishable from zero), the PET estimate should be 
taken, and when the average bias-corrected effect size from PET is statistically significant, the 
PEESE estimate should be taken (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
We identified six studies with bias-corrected effect sizes for the immediate enhancement or 
rebound effect that were beyond three standard deviations from the averaged effect size. These 
outliers were not excluded as sensitivity analyses confirmed that their exclusion made no substantive 
difference to the averaged effect size and variability estimates. The 31 studies included in the present 
meta-analysis were published between 1987 and 2015. In total, these yielded 83 unique effect sizes 
that captured the suppression group’s target thought occurrence or accessibility relative to that of the 
expression group during the thought suppression (k = 42; n = 1892) and the rebound period (k = 41; n 
= 1636) respectively. 
Main Analysis 
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Results of the meta-analysis are presented in Table 1. Consistent with Wegner’s (1994) theory 
and our predictions, results supported the hypothesis that cognitive load is a precondition for the 
manifestation of immediate enhancement effects. This is because while the overall immediate 
enhancement effect size was negative and statistically significant (d+ = -1.10, 95% CI [-1.53, -0.67]), 
subsequent analyses of studies with and without cognitive load yielded different effect sizes. 
Specifically, our analysis of studies without cognitive load yielded a statistically significant negative 
effect size (d+ = -1.38, 95% CI [-1.84, -0.93]), with confidence intervals that did not encompass zero. 
In contrast, our analysis of studies incorporating cognitive load yielded a significant positive effect 
size (d+ = 0.34, 95% CI [0.07, 0.61]), with confidence intervals that did not encompass zero. 
Critically, confidence intervals about the difference in the effect sizes in groups of studies with and 
without cognitive load did not include zero (ddiff+ = 1.73, 95% CI [1.19, 2.26], t = 6.35, p < .001). 
Taken together, these findings indicate that participants in suppression conditions experienced fewer 
target thought occurrences or lower accessibility during the suppression task compared to 
participants in expression control conditions when cognitive load was absent. When cognitive load 
was imposed however, participants in suppression conditions not only failed to suppress the target 
thought, but, ironically, experienced greater levels of occurrence and accessibility of the thought 
during the suppression task compared to participants in expression control conditions. Results also 
supported our prediction for the rebound effect. Specifically, a significant overall rebound effect was 
observed (d+ = 0.19, 95% CI [0.02, 0.35]) with overlapping confidence intervals for studies with (d+ 
= 0.08, 95% CI [-0.75, 0.90]) and without (d+ = 0.19, 95% CI [0.02, 0.36]) cognitive load (ddiff+ = -
0.12, 95% CI [-0.95, 0.72], t = -0.27, p = .789). Given that cognitive load does not seem to 
significantly moderate rebound effects, the overall rebound effect was interpreted (Aiken & West, 
1991). We conclude that participants who previously suppressed a target thought generally 
experienced greater levels of target thought occurrence or accessibility during the rebound period 
compared to those who previously concentrated on the same thought. 
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The moderation effect of cognitive load on immediate enhancement effects was also 
corroborated by heterogeneity statistics, presented in Table 1. These show that categorising studies 
based on the presence of cognitive load seem to reduce the observed heterogeneity in effect sizes 
across studies to a trivial level. However, given the different numbers of studies in the cognitive load 
and no cognitive load categories, it remains unclear whether the heterogeneity statistics were biased 
or a reflection of true homogeneity. 
Small Study Bias 
As results from the main meta-analysis and PET analyses indicated non-zero effects, the 
PEESE estimate was taken as an estimate for the effect of small study bias on effect sizes (Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2014). Results suggest that significant small study bias is present for both immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects. While the bias-corrected PEESE estimate did not reveal a different 
pattern of results with respect to the direction and significance of the immediate enhancement effect, 
the same cannot be said for the rebound effect. Specifically, the bias corrected PEESE estimate for 
the rebound effect was not significantly different from zero. One possibility for this difference is that 
PET-PEESE tests assumes a fixed effects model, rather than a random effects model on which the 
main meta-analysis was based. Furthermore, Carter et al. (2017) suggested that the precision of 
PEESE estimates can be attenuated under conditions of high heterogeneity in the effect size, and 
therefore does not provide conclusive evidence for the presence of bias. 
---Insert Table 1 here--- 
Discussion 
Control over unwanted thoughts through suppression is an important human function that 
may lead to adaptive outcomes in multiple domains, such as inhibiting stereotypical judgements 
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2007), smoking cessation (Erskine, Georgiou, & Kvavilashvili, 2010), 
dieting (Erskine & Georgiou, 2010), and psychological well-being in general (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000). However, theory and research has suggested that the act of thought suppression may be 
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counterproductive as a means to control thoughts (e.g., Slepian et al, 2014; Wegner 1994). Studies 
have demonstrated ‘ironic’ effects of thought suppression in which active avoidance of a target 
thought leads to greater preoccupation with that thought compared to deliberately concentrating on 
the same thought, both during and after thought suppression (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993). While meta-
analytic research has supported the ‘rebound’ effect after thought suppression, there has not been 
concomitant support for the ‘immediate enhancement’ effect during suppression (Abramowitz et al., 
2001; Magee et al., 2012). However, according to Wegner (1994), a necessary precondition to 
observe the immediate enhancement effect is the presence of sufficient cognitive load, which limits 
individuals’ capacity to generate and focus on distractors in order to suppress the unwanted thought. 
Previous meta-analyses either did not test the immediate enhancement effect under conditions of 
cognitive load (Abramowitz et al., 2001), or did not provide separate immediate enhancement effect 
sizes in the presence and absence of this critical moderator (Magee et al., 2012). Both analyses also 
concluded that the overall immediate enhancement effect size was in the opposite direction to that 
predicted by Wegner (1994), suggesting an absence of the effect. In the current meta-analysis, we 
tested whether previous research supports the immediate enhancement effect by accounting for 
cognitive load during thought suppression. Specifically, we systematically examined the role of 
cognitive load in facilitating immediate enhancement effects by including cognitive load as a 
moderator variable in an updated meta-analysis of research on ironic effects in thought suppression. 
Findings show that when cognitive load was not accounted for, the immediate enhancement 
effect was absent, a result consistent with previous meta-analytic findings, which led researchers to 
conclude that the immediate enhancement effect does not exist (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee 
et al., 2012; Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005). However, our meta-analysis identified an immediate 
enhancement effect among studies that imposed cognitive load during suppression, consistent with 
our predictions and the original proposals of Wegner (1994). We also found a small but significant 
rebound effect that is not moderated by presence of cognitive load. As such, while rebound effects 
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appear to be consistent across studies, previous meta-analytic findings indicating that the immediate 
enhancement effect is absent are misleading as they do not account for cognitive load during 
suppression. Our analysis is the first to identify the importance of cognitive load as a precondition in 
producing the immediate enhancement effect. 
The present findings have clear theoretical implications for thought suppression. Consistent 
with Wegner’s (1994) reasoning, the absence of an immediate enhancement effect in conditions of no 
cognitive load indicates that when the intentional system is not burdened by cognitive load, thought 
suppression is usually effective. However, the immediate enhancement effect observed under 
cognitive load suggests that when the intentional system is pre-occupied, individuals suppressing a 
thought not only fail, but ironically experience greater frequency of occurrence and accessibility of 
the unwanted thought. As Wegner predicted, cognitive load appears to be a catalyst for intentional 
system failure and therefore a precondition for the manifestation of immediate enhancement effects. 
Our study is the first to confirm this prediction of Wegner’s theory in a synthesis of findings across 
studies and confirm the role of the intentional system in thought suppression and its vulnerability to 
impedance when processes compete for mental resources. 
The lack of a moderation effect of cognitive load on rebound effects also supports theoretical 
predictions. While the immediate enhancement effect can be attributed to failure of the intentional 
system, rebound effects are conceptualized to be the result of the negative cueing mechanism 
(Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987). Our findings suggest that intentional system failure is only 
implicated in immediate enhancement effects but not rebound effects, giving support to the notion 
that the two effects are driven by different mechanisms. However, an important caveat to these 
conclusions is that the estimate of effect size for the rebound effect under cognitive load was based 
on a very small sample of studies (k =3) with significant heterogeneity. The effect size should not, 
therefore, be considered highly reliable. In summary, our findings are the first to provide 
confirmation of both the immediate enhancement effect and rebound effect across thought 
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suppression experiments. 
Interestingly, based on studies that demonstrated an immediate enhancement effect under 
cognitive load (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993; Slepian et al., 2014; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al., 
1993), we speculate that the nature of the dependent measure of thought suppression may moderate 
thought suppression effects. This is because one feature that studies demonstrating the immediate 
enhancement effect under cognitive load have in common is their employment of non-self-report 
dependent measures. For example, rather than asking participants to recall how many times the target 
thought crossed their mind (Wang, Chatzisarantis, & Hagger, 2018), these studies mostly used 
implicit measures of target thought accessibility such as through Stroop reaction times (Slepian et al., 
2014)5. On the other hand, the only study that did not demonstrate the immediate enhancement effect 
under cognitive load adopted a self-report measure of target thought occurrences (Magee & Zinbarg, 
2007). These observations are consistent with Wegner’s (2009) theory which suggests that, in 
addition to the pre-requisite of cognitive load, reliable detection of immediate enhancement effects 
may be contingent on using “measures of thought that are sensitive to automatic, uncontrollable 
indications of the thought” (Wegner, 2009, p. 48). Our speculation is supported by previous 
theoretical suggestions that self-report measures may be less conducive to detecting immediate 
enhancement effects as participants may be motivated to under-report their target thought 
occurrences during suppression to reflect conformity to task instructions (Abramowitz et al., 2001; 
Purdon & Clark, 2000; Purdon & Clark, 2001). Non-self-report measures of thought suppression 
may not be subject to such bias, and may be more conducive to tapping into the automatic, 
uncontrolled, and impulsive nature of intrusive thoughts, as Wegner (2009) suggests. Type of 
measure may be another important moderator of immediate enhancement effects alongside cognitive 
                                                             
5It is important to note is that in his comprehensive review, Wegner (1994) mentioned a few additional 
unpublished experiments (e.g., Wegner, Erber, & Bowman, 1993) that supported the immediate enhancement 
effect under cognitive load. However, we were unable to obtain sufficient data from these experiments for 
effect size calculations and therefore do not make any predictions on the effect that these experiments may 
have on the present results were they included in the meta-analysis. 
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load. Future studies should, therefore, systematically explore the moderating effect of dependent 
variable measure (i.e., self-report vs non-self-report) on thought suppression under cognitive load. 
The present meta-analytic findings have important implications for researchers in the field of 
thought suppression. Given the crucial role of cognitive load in engendering immediate enhancement 
effects, researchers aiming to test immediate enhancement effects should incorporate cognitive load 
into their study designs for a fair and valid test of Wegner’s (1994) predictions. In addition, 
researchers tasked with judging the quality of thought suppression studies should take the findings of 
the present study into consideration. Specifically, studies that do not impose cognitive load should 
not be considered valid tests of the immediate enhancement effects. Tests of the rebound effect 
should not be subject to such restrictions. 
At the applied level, the findings of the present meta-analysis suggest that the value of 
thought suppression as a mental control strategy is contingent on the criteria used to evaluate its 
effectiveness. In the short term, thought suppression appears to be adaptive if individuals are 
unburdened by cognitive load, but maladaptive and counterproductive if cognitive load is present. In 
the long term, thought suppression appears, overall, to be maladaptive as a means for controlling 
unwanted thoughts as individuals engaging in suppression tend to experience an exacerbated level of 
preoccupation with the once-suppressed target thought to those that do not engage in suppression in 
the first place. However, given the relatively small effect size of the rebound effect, it could be 
argued that the insidious effects of thought suppression may be overstated (Najmi et al., 2009). This 
is especially noteworthy since studies have generally only measured rebound effects over periods 
equal in duration to the thought suppression period (Magee et al., 2012). It is, therefore, unclear how 
long rebound effects persist beyond the first 10 minutes post-suppression. Future researchers are 
therefore encouraged to investigate the longevity of the post-suppression rebound effect. 
It is important to note that while thought suppression is relevant to many of the tasks and 
behaviors that people experience in their everyday lives, findings in this domain have been criticized 
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for their lack of generalizability. For example, thought suppression endeavors in naturalistic contexts 
are mostly spontaneous and self-initiated, while experimental manipulations of thought suppression 
are usually externally prompted (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). It is therefore possible that the 
immediate enhancement effects observed in laboratory experiments are inflated by reactance – 
individuals’ tendency to act in a way that is opposite to how they have been instructed (Brehm, 
1966). As such, to increase generalizability of findings to natural settings, future thought suppression 
studies should seek to utilize more ecologically-valid protocols. In a similar vein, no studies to date 
have examined the influence of cognitive load on the immediate enhancement effect using thought 
suppression paradigms lasting longer than 10 minutes or repeated across multiple episodes. It is not, 
therefore, known whether cognitive load is an equally important boundary condition for detecting the 
immediate enhancement effect in long term thought suppression endeavors. Interestingly, Wegner 
(1994) has speculated that the effortful intentional system may become more automated and hence 
less resource demanding over time. If this is the case, then thought suppression in the long term, 
should, in principle, be less vulnerable to the diverting of mental resources by cognitive load. As 
such, to further delineate the specific conditions under which cognitive load would engender the 
immediate enhancement effect, future studies are encouraged to utilize lengthier thought suppression 
protocols. 
Application of analyses designed to detect small study bias indicated the presence of bias, 
mostly concerning the robustness of the rebound effect, which, even in previous meta-analyses 
(Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012), was shown to be small in size. Specifically, it seems 
that correction for bias raises questions over the true magnitude and even the existence of the effect. 
This has also been demonstrated in high profile cases in which meta-analytic estimates were found to 
be subject to substantive bias using these techniques (Carter, Kofler, Forster & McCullough, 2015; 
Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014). There are, however, important caveats to these analyses, and it 
would be unwise to draw definitive conclusions as to the existence of the effect based on the present 
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findings alone. First, small study bias tests provide statistical predictions and do not confirm the 
actual presence or magnitude of small study bias (Borenstein et al., 2009). Second, recent research 
has highlighted limitations of the PET-PEESE technique in correcting for bias in groups of studies 
with moderate levels of heterogeneity or greater (Stanley, 2017). As such, large-sample, high-
powered single and multilab preregistered replication studies are encouraged to resolve this issue. 
Such research may confirm the significance and magnitude of the rebound effect. Similarly, given 
the small number of studies incorporating cognitive load in tests of the immediate enhancement 
phenomenon, large-scale pre-registered studies adopting factorial designs to test independent and 
interactive effects of suppression and cognitive load on the manifestation of immediate enhancement 
effects should be considered a priority for future research. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While the present analysis contributes to the existing thought suppression literature by 
identifying the importance of cognitive load in detecting the immediate enhancement effect, some 
limitations should be noted. First, while some of the studies manipulated cognitive load as a within- 
or between-participants effect (Wegner & Erber, 1992), most cognitive load inductions were part of 
the overall paradigm and did not include a manipulation (Magee & Zinbarg, 2007; Slepian et al., 
2014). As a consequence, the current analysis compared sets of studies that tested the rebound and 
immediate enhancement effects under cognitive load with those that did not. We did not, therefore, 
test the effect of manipulating cognitive load on thought suppression. This should be acknowledged 
as a limitation of the current analysis, and there is a need for further studies that systematically 
manipulate the presence of cognitive load and examine their effects on thought suppression, both 
during and after suppression. 
Second, the small number of studies that incorporated cognitive load also precluded 
evaluation of meaningful moderators of the immediate enhancement effect in studies incorporating 
cognitive load. Other methodological parameters might be expected to mitigate or augment the 
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effects of cognitive load on immediate enhancement effects, such as sample characteristics, target 
thought characteristics, and cognitive load characteristics. For example, type of cognitive load may 
be a key moderator of the immediate enhancement effect – some load tasks may engage individuals’ 
cognitive resources more extensively that others, particularly those required for attention to, and 
suppression of, the target thought. It is important to note that means to manipulate cognitive load 
varied across studies (e.g., pain tolerance tasks, word association tasks under time pressure, 
memorization tasks). The disparate nature of these tasks and the relatively small number of studies 
that included cognitive load precluded moderator analyses testing the effects of these different types 
of cognitive load task on the immediate enhancement effect. As the literature matures, future 
analyses should seek to test the type or degree of cognitive load as a moderator of the immediate 
enhancement effect. Nevertheless, evidence stemming from previous primary and meta-analytic 
studies have documented some methodological parameters to moderate the effect of thought 
suppression (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001). For example, occurrence and 
accessibility of the target thought during thought suppression are suggested to increase when these 
dependent measures are recorded in an implicit manner, or when the suppression task is longer in 
duration. Importantly, if factors other than cognitive load moderate effects of thought suppression in 
conditions of no cognitive load then it is plausible that they will also exert the same moderation 
effect in conditions of cognitive load, ultimately affecting the manifestation of the immediate 
enhancement effect. 
An additional limitation is the interpretation of rebound effect sizes from cross-over studies. 
Specifically, rebound effect sizes from cross-over studies are calculated by comparing target thought 
occurrences or accessibility between the expression periods in both the ‘initial suppression’ group 
and the ‘initial expression’ group. While this method of effect size extraction was chosen in 
accordance with the original conceptualization of the rebound effect in Wegner et al.’s (1987) study, 
this comparison has been considered problematic because instruction type is confounded by the 
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number of thinking periods in which participants are required to engage (Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991). 
For example, when the expression period takes place in the first five minutes of the experiment in 
one group but in the second five minutes in a second group, one cannot be certain that the between-
group difference in target thought occurrences is the result of the rebound effect rather than fatigue. 
As such, rebound effect sizes from cross-over studies should be interpreted with caution. Immediate 
enhancement effect sizes from cross-over studies on the other hand, do not suffer from the same 
problem since the first thinking period from both the suppression condition and expression condition 
are compared. 
A final limitation of the current analysis is that the included studies did not directly confirm 
activation of the intentional system during cognitive load, which is the purported mechanism for the 
moderating effect of cognitive load on the immediate enhancement effect. Rather, implicating the 
intentional system as an explanation for the effect is inferred indirectly through the manipulation of 
cognitive load. Although neuroimaging studies have identified brain regions responsible for thought 
suppression (Butler & James, 2010; Noreen, O’Connor, & MacLeod, 2016; Wyland, Kelley, Macrae, 
Gordon, & Heatherton, 2003), none have specifically examined the neurological correlates of 
intentional system activation and effects of cognitive load during thought suppression. Future 
research should adopt neuroimaging methods to explore the role of the intentional system as the 
mechanism by which cognitive load moderates the immediate enhancement effect. 
Conclusion 
Given the inconsistencies between Wegner’s (1994) ironic process theory and previous meta-
analytic findings (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012) on the presence of the immediate 
enhancement effect, the present meta-analysis sought to bridge this gap by offering a ‘good faith’ test 
of this ironic effect. We believed that previous meta-analytic findings suggesting an absence of the 
immediate enhancement effect are misleading (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Magee et al., 2012) because 
they had not taken into account cognitive load, which, according to Wegner (1994), is an essential 
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precondition to observing the immediate enhancement effect. Converging with Wegner’s (1994) 
predictions, and those of our own, our findings indicate that individuals consistently experience 
higher levels of target thought preoccupation after suppressing the target thought when compared to 
individuals that concentrate on the target thought. Ironic increases in unwanted thought 
preoccupation during suppression, on the other hand, emerged only under cognitive load. This 
finding suggests a pivotal role for the intentional system in the search for distractors during attempts 
to avoid unwanted thoughts, and the detrimental effects of diverting mental resources away from this 
resource dependent process. Future researchers should consider cognitive load as a precondition for 
the emergence and detection of the immediate enhancement effect. Finally, tests of small study bias 
seem to indicate potential bias in the rebound effect across studies. These data suggest that large-
scale multilab pre-registered replication attempts using standardised protocols are needed to confirm 
the robustness and magnitude of the rebound phenomenon. 
In summary, current theory and empirical evidence suggests that while thought suppression 
may be an effective mental control strategy when individuals devote their undivided attention to 
suppressing a particular thought, ironies during thought suppression (Wegner, 1994) will emerge if 
this attention is divided. Specifically, when intentional search of distractors is burdened by cognitive 
load, individuals will be more preoccupied with, and vulnerable to, forbidden thoughts during an 
active period of thought suppression than if they actually concentrated on the same thought. 
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Figure 1. Study designs used in thought suppression experiments. Immediate enhancement effects are conceptualized as the difference in target 
thought occurrences or accessibility between groups/phases marked a in the figure. Rebound effects are conceptualized as the difference in 
target thought occurrences or accessibility between groups/phases marked b in the figure 
Table 1 
Results of Meta-Analysis Testing Ironic Process Theory and Corresponding Bias Statistics 
Note. k = number of unique effect sizes in meta-analysis; N = total sample size in meta-analysis; d+ = weighted standardized difference effect 
size; CI95 = 95% confidence interval; LL = Lower limit of confidence interval; UL = Upper limit of confidence interval; Fixed = fixed effect 
model; Random = random effects model; Q = Cochran’s (1952) Q Statistic; I2 = Higgins and Thompson’s (2002) I2 statistic; T2= Absolute 
heterogeneity statistic; d+PET = Bias corrected effect size estimate using the precision-effect estimate technique; d+PEESE = Bias corrected 
effect size estimate using the precision-effect estimate with standard error technique; p-BIAS = Probability value for effect of precision estimate 
on effect size in regression analysis. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 
Effect k N Fixed d+ d+CI95 Random  d+ CI95 Q I2 T2 Bias statistics 
    LL UL d+ LL UL    d+PET d+PEESE p-BIAS 
Immediate enhancement 
effect (overall) 
42 1892 -1.10*** -1.53 -0.67 -1.10*** -1.53 -0.67 445.97*** 96% 1.82 -0.261*** -0.391*** < .001 
Immediate enhancement 
effect (no cognitive load) 
35 1537 -0.80*** -0.89 -0.72 -1.38*** -1.84 -0.93 335.28*** 96% 1.72 -0.315*** -0.528*** < .001 
Immediate enhancement 
effect (cognitive load) 
7 355 0.35** 0.14 0.56 0.34* 0.07 0.61 10.86 32% 0.04 0.641 0.523** .366 
Rebound effect (overall) 41 1636 0.19* 0.02 0.35 0.19* 0.02 0.35 112.57*** 72% 0.16 -0.183** -0.068 < .001 
Rebound effect (no 
cognitive load) 
38 1555 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.19* 0.02 0.36 105.19*** 73% 0.16 -0.198** -0.080 < .001 
Rebound effect 
(cognitive load) 
3 81 0.22 -0.23 0.67 0.08 -0.75 0.90 6.71* 68% 0.36 3.527** 1.919** .011 
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Appendix B 
List of Eligible Studies Not Included in the Present Meta-Analysis Due to Insufficient Information for 
the Calculation of an Effect Size 
Cook, D. A. (1995). Confronting and subduing the beast within: The struggle for the cognitive 
control of prejudice and the effects of suppressing racist thoughts (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
Gildston, P. (1998). Nonreplicating white bears and other irrepressible cautions (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). The City University of New York, New York. 
Erskine, J, Georgiou, G. J., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2010). I suppress, therefore I smoke: Effects of 
thought suppression on smoking behavior. Psychological Science, 21, 1225–1230. 
doi:10.1177/095 6797610378687 
Förster, J., & Liberman, N. (2001). The role of attribution of motivation in producing 
postsuppressional rebound. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 377-390. doi: 
10.1037//0022-3514.81.3.377 
Harnden, J. L., McNally, R. J., & Jimerson, D. C. (1997). Effects of suppressing thoughts about body 
weight: A comparison of dieters and nondieters. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 
22, 285–290. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1098-108X(199711)22:3<285::AID-EAT7>3.0.CO;2-J 
Kelly, A. E., & Kahn, J. H. (1994). Effects of suppression of personal intrusive thoughts. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 998–1006. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.03.070 
Wegner, D. M., Erber, R., & Zanakos, S. (1993). Ironic processes in the mental control of mood and 
mood-related thought. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1093–1104. 
doi:10.1037/0022- 3514.65.6.1093 
Wegner, D. M., Wenzlaff, R. M., & Kozak, M. (2004). Dream rebound: The return of suppressed 
thoughts in dreams. Psychological Science, 15, 232–236. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.014 
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Appendix C 
Characteristics and Effect Sizes of Studies Included in the Present Meta-Analysis 
Study Sample 
type 
N Study 
design 
Cognitive 
load 
DV recording 
method 
Suppression 
durationa 
  IE R 
Andersson et al. (2006) TIN 30 B No SR 5   -1.03 -0.39 
Bates (2006)bc NC 38 B No SR 5   -1.62 0.81 
Behar et al. (2005) NC 16 B No SR 5   -3.39 0.63 
 NC 20 B No SR 5   -2.23 -0.44 
 NC 17 B No SR 5   -5.25 0.48 
 NC 18 B No SR 5   -2.65 -0.10 
Blechman (2002)c OCD 48 C No SR 5   0.01 -0.07 
Bourdon et al. (2001) NC 20 C No SR 5   -1.22 -0.57 
 NC 18 C No SR 5   -1.77 0.64 
Cioffi & Holloway (1993)b NC 42 B Yes NSR -   0.81 0.80 
Erskine (2008) NC 87 B No SR 5   -1.95 -0.12 
Galinsky & Moskowitz 
(2007)a 
NC 18 B No SR 5    1.17 
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Gilhooly et al. (2015) NC 126 B No SR 3   -1.36  
Giuliano & Wicha (2010) NC 20 B No SR 2   -1.57 0.64 
Guinote (2007) NC 39 C No SR 5   -0.99 1.05 
 NC 45 C No SR 5   -0.71 0.47 
Hedt (2005)c PTSD 32 B No SR 10   -2.06 -0.04 
Lowery (2002)c OCD 31 B No SR 5   -2.55 -0.97 
 NC 30 B No SR 5   -4.74 0.06 
Magee & Zinbarg (2007) ANX 19 B Yes SR 5   -0.28 -0.27 
 NC 20 B Yes SR 5   -0.65 -0.47 
Matthews & Milroy (1994) ANX 20 B No SR 5    -0.32 
 NC 20 B No SR 5    0.16 
Merckelbach et al. (1991) NC 29 C No NSR 5   0.99 0.75 
Muris et al. (1998) NC 49 B No SR -   0.52 0.65 
 SP 35 B No SR -   -0.56 -0.02 
Raffield (1998) c NC 56 W No SR 5   -1.37 0.11 
Rassin et al. (2005) NC 40 B No SR 5   -1.48  
Roemer (1995) c ANX 30 B No SRc 5   -1.85 0.37 
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 NC 30 B No SRc 5   -3.28 -0.99 
Roemer & Borkovec (1994) NC 30 C No SR 5   -0.94 -0.35 
 NC 30 C No SR 5   -4.68 0.68 
 NC 30 C No SR 5   -1.73 0.86 
Rutledge et al. (1996) NC 134 W No SR 9   -0.51 -0.13 
 NC 144 W No SR 9   -0.53 -0.12 
Rutledge (1998) NC 109 W No SR 9   -0.83 -0.19 
Rutledge et al. (1993)b NC 22 C No SR 5   -1.45 -0.55 
 NC 21 W No SR 5   -0.88 -0.19 
Slepian et al. (2014)b NC 96 B Yes NSR 5   0.45  
 NC 99 B Yes NSR 5   0.20  
Tong et al. (2013) NC 42 B No NSR -    0.94 
 NC 66 B No NSR -    0.60 
Trinder & Salkovskis (1994) NC 32 B No SR 4 days   1.67  
Wegner & Erber (1992) NC 56 B Yes NSR -   0.54  
 NC 23 B Yes NSR -   0.76  
Wegner & Gold (1995) NC 49 B No SR 8    0.78 
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Wegner et al. (1987) NC 34 C No SR 5   -0.55 0.57 
Wegner et al. (1991) NC 47 B No SR 5   .53 .76 
Note. Cells without values indicate that this information did not have a fixed value, usually due to individual differences in time taken to finish 
task. We did not report mean age statistics above because this information was usually only provided for entire experiments, rather than groups 
used in each comparison listed above. All comparisons that incorporated cognitive load utilised the number memory task as the cognitive load, 
except Wegner & Erber (1992; Exp1) and Cioffi & Holloway (1993), in which time pressure and a pain tolerance task served as the cognitive 
load respectively. aDuration in minutes; bStudies for which participant splits could not be obtained (or that they include missing values) and 
therefore it was assumed that the experimental and non-suppression control groups had equal sample sizes (or the missing value was assumed to 
be distributed evenly amongst conditions of relevance; cUnpublished study. NC = Non-clinical sample (usually of students); OCD = Participants 
with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder symptoms; PTSD = Participants with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms; SP = Participants with 
Specific Phobia symptoms; ANX = Participants with other anxiety symptoms such social anxiety and generalised anxiety; B = Studies adopting 
a between-participants design; W = Studies adopting a within-participants design; C = Studies adopting crossover design; DV = Dependent 
variable; SR = Self-report/overt/explicit; NSR = Non-self-report/covert/implicit; IE = immediate enhancement effect size (d); R = rebound effect 
size (d). 
 
